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Add X.509 trust model guidance #240
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| The *CAWG trust list* MUST be configured to recognize certificates with `id-kp-emailProtection` (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) for *identity assertions* issued during the validity window described above. | ||
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| For this EKU, the following certificate policy IDs MUST be accepted: |
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Is this intended to say "only certificates with these CPs will be accepted"? If so:
- The wording should be adjusted
- Does this reflect real-world usage? It's a bit of a wild west out there in terms of the CPs being added to certificates.
Co-authored-by: Leonard Rosenthol <leonardr@lazerware.com>
Co-authored-by: Charlie Halford <charlie.halford@gmail.com>
# Conflicts: # docs/modules/ROOT/partials/credential-types/x509.adoc
| IMPORTANT: This list does not include Mailbox-validated or “legacy” certificate purpose OIDs. | ||
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| NOTE: The issuance criteria for such certificates are specified by the CA/Browser Forum in https://cabforum.org/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-SMIMEBR-1.0.11.pdf[Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted S/MIME Certificates, version 1.0.11] and may be updated in subsequent versions. | ||
| 4. The certificate chains up to one of the following roots of trust: |
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| 4. The certificate chains up to one of the following roots of trust: | |
| 4. The lists below may include both CA and end-entity certificates. The certificate under validation MUST either be directly included in one of these lists, or have a valid chain of trust to a certificate present in one of these lists. |
The IPTC list currently includes end-entity certificates, can we ensure validators support this? That's usually the assumption with end-entity certs in trust lists, but it would be good to be explicit.
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